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1. Introduction
Nowadays the wireless sensor networks (WSN) are increasingly being required for applica-
tions where the data reliability needs to be duly guaranteed. Due to this, many research works
have been directed in this sense. However, WSN security is not an entirely solved issue.
The aim on this chapter is to use Petri Nets (PN) to model and analyze the validity of an
encryption scheme applied to WSN. Usually the modeling of communication systems can be-
come quite complex, most of the time is necessary to consider a large number of variables and
mathematical models to describe them. Nevertheless, structural properties of a system and
dynamic characteristics of its behavior can not be properly derived from those models. On the
other hand, PN can model dynamic characteristics such as synchronization and concurrency.
PN were developed by Carl A. Petri in 1962 as a mathematical tool for the study of commu-
nication with automata. Its further development was facilitated by the fact that PN can be
used to model properties such as process synchronization, concurrent operations, conflicts
or resource sharing and deadlock freedom among others (Reisig, 1986), (Reisig & Rozenberg,
1998). In literature we found works where PN have been used in order to model and ana-
lyze several related aspects of a WSN. In (Chen et al., 2008) the authors use PN to determine
the minimal necessary number of devices in a coal mine, in order to establish the location of
miners in case of accident. There are many works related to power constrains, most recently
work (Liu, Ren, Lin & Jiang, 2008) deals with the power saving problem, where the authors
have proposed four sleeps scheduling schemes for different sorts of and analyze each of them
by Stochastic Petri Net (SPN). By using the steady state probability matrix of the SPN models
is obtained the average power consumptions and events delays. Also, there are many ref-
erences devoted to communication protocols and recently in reference (Haines et al., 2007),
PN are used as a formal verification technique of a MAC protocol. Where a case study is
presented applying this technique to IEEE 802.11 centralised control mechanisms to support
delay sensitive streams and fading data traffic. In reference (Pengand et al., 2007) author have
used the PN to model the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and accomplished its verification.
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Another interesting work is presented in (Liu, Ye, Zhang & Li, 2008) where the 802.11i 4-way
handshake protocol is analyzed utilizing High-level Petri Nets, confirming that the protocol
is vulnerable to Denial-of-Service attack during handshake, then the authors propose an im-
proved key management scheme.
The goal of the chapter is to present the most important part of the PN theory and to describe
the possibilities of practical applications on WSN.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the WSN are introduced, theirs principal char-
acteristics and basic architectures, a brief introduction about to EC and LDPC codes and the
basic concepts of PN are explained as well. In Section 3, we focus on the description of a com-
munication model considered in order to a WSN. In Section 4, deal with the modeling phase
bymeans of PN for our system. A PNmodel for the communication system and cryptography
protocol are developed. Finally, we dedicated both a section to the conclusions and another to
the references.-
2. Basic Concepts
In this section we developed briefly the topics that we are needed to better understand this
work. For a deeper understanding look up the cited bibliography in each case.
2.1 The WSNs
The WSNs are defined as compound networks of a large number of tiny devices called sensor
nodes, which have limited processing power, storage, bandwidth, and energy. In addition, a
WSN might be often deployment on a large scale throughout a geographic region in hostile
environments.
According to how sensors are grouped and how the information of sensors is routed through
the network, there are two basic architectures to WSN, flat and hierarchical. In a flat architec-
ture all nodes have almost the same communication capabilities and resource constraints and
the information is routed by each sensor. In a hierarchical architecture, the sensor nodes are
grouped in clusters where one of the member nodes is the "cluster head". This node is respon-
sible for management and routing tasks. Fig. 1(a) shows a flat WSN model and a hierarchical
WSN configuration is showed in Fig. 1(b).
(a) Flat WSN Model (b) Hierarchical WSN Model
Fig. 1. Architectures of Wireless Sensor Network
Further regarding the properties of the sensing interfaces of their nodes the WSNs can be
classified in homogeneous (HoWSN) or heterogeneous (HeWSN). The HoWSN are character-
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ized by the fact that all network nodes have the same properties unlike the heterogeneous
(HeWSN) where nodes of different nature like temperature and movement sensors coexist.
Fig. 1(b) shows a HeWSN. Including the base station there are three types of nodes: base
nodes, header nodes and sensors nodes. The base station is the interface between an appli-
cation and a sensor network. The application network implements all the programs which
manage the sensor network. The header nodes are devices with capability to route informa-
tion that comes from other nodes. The sensor nodes are those that perceive changes produced
in the environment such as temperature, humidity, light, movement among others.
Fig. 1(b) also shows the clustered sensor network. The sensor network is divided into several
clusters. The headlines represent connection between the header nodes and the base station.
Then header nodes manage the sensor nodes and route messages from others nodes; the sen-
sor nodes are scattered in the monitoring field and it implements data process such as reading,
encrypting, encoding and transmission.
As shown in the Fig. 2, a sensor node is composed of four basic components: sensing unit,
processing unit, transceiver unit and a power unit.
Fig. 2. Components of a Sensor
The sensing units are usually composed of two sub-units: Sensors and analogy-to-digital con-
verters (ADCs). The analogy signals perceived by the sensor which are based in the observed
phenomenon are converted to digital signals by the ADC, and then they are nourished to the
unit of processing. The process unit, that is generally associated to a little storage device, man-
ages / handles the procedures which make the sensor node collaborates with the others nodes
in order to carry out the assigned sensor task.
2.2 Elliptic Curves
In our scheme we are using an elliptic curve defined over a finite field of characteristic two. In
this case we only considered a representation of field elements and exist efficient way to effect
arithmetic operations. The option we choose is to use optimal normal base (ONB). In which
the add operation can accomplish by means of the operation XOR, without cost; squaring can
be performed simply by a cycle shift of the coordinates of an element, hence, in hardware, it is
almost cost free. A normal basis multiplication is not so simple but always more efficient than
in other base. Reference over multiplication in ONB can be found in (Reyhani, 2003; 2006).
According to (Hankerson et al., 2004), an elliptic curve over a finite field F2m is defined as the
set of points that satisfies the following equation:
E : y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b (1)
where a, b ∈ F2m and b = 0 in F2m . The set of solutions (x, y) joined with a point at infinity,
and special addition operation define an abelian group, are called the elliptic curve group.
An Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) bases its security in the Elliptic Discrete Logarithm
Problem (EDLP), that is, in the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) defined on the group of
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rational points of an elliptic curve.
Given an elliptic curve E over a finite field F, a point G ∈ E(F) and another known point Q
which is multiple of that point G. the problem is to find the integer n such that nG = Q. This
problem is computationally difficult to solve.
2.3 LDPC codes
The Low-density parity check (LDPC) codes were introduced by Robert Gallager in 1962 (Gal-
lager, 1962), but with computational capabilities available then were dismissed. In the mid 90
were rediscovered by MacKay (MacKay, 1990) reaching great popularity by his performance
closely to Shannon limit.
LDPC codes are a class of linear block codes characterized to have its sparse parity-check ma-
trix which contains only a few 1’s in comparison to the amount of 0’s. In other words, the
degree of all nodes is low. These codes can be represented by a Tanner bipartite graph con-
sisting of two sets of nodes {ci} and { fi}, respectively called variable nodes and check nodes.
See example in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Tanner Bipartite Graph
There are two kinds of LDPC codes: regular and irregular. For regular LDPC codes, all nodes
of the same type have the same degree. For irregular LDPC codes, the degree of each set of
nodes is chosen according to some distributions. A code vector c is obtained multiplying a
message vector m by a generate matrix G
c = m ∗ G (2)
The corresponding check matrix H has the property to be constructed with independent lin-
eally rows vectors has which form a subspace of the subspace generated by the rows vectors
of G. This signifies than each vector code satisfies the condition:
H ∗ c = 0 (3)
property that enables the decoding.
In (Castiñeira & Guy, 2006) we found a chapter dedicated to the binary LDPC codes. De-
scription, construction and decoding algorithms can be studied here. Other reference about
to construction of codes is (Carrasco & Johnston, 2008).
The decoding of LDPC codes is based on sum product algorithm (SPA), also called belief prop-
agation algorithm (BPA), or message passing algorithm (MPA) which iteratively updates the
posterior probabilities of bit nodes.
If we defined qi,j(b), b ∈ {0, 1}, as the probability computed based both on the received signal
yi and the message rj′ ,i(b) passed from the neighbors check nodes ci excluding the check node
j. Also, we defined ri,j(b) as the probability computed based on the message qj′ ,i(b) passed
from the neighbors variable nodes vj excluding the variable node i .
The MPA in the probability domain then proceeds as follows.
www.intechopen.com
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1. Estimate the noise power σ2 . Then for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, initialize Pi(b) = prob(ci = b/yi).
2. Set qij(b) = Pj(b) if the variable node i and the check node j are connected.
3. Update rij(b) using {
rji(0) =
1
2 +
1
2 ∏i′∈vj\i (1− 2qi′ j(1)),
rji(1) = 1− rji(0)
4. Update qij(b) using
qij(b) = KijP(b) ∏
j′∈ci\j
(rj′ i(b)); b = 0, 1
where Kij is chosen to meet qij(0) + qij(1) = 1.
5. Compute the posterior probability of the code bit ci using
Qi(b) = KiPi(b) ∏
j∈ci
(rij(b)); b = 0, 1
where Ki is chosen to ensure that Qi(0) + Qi(1) = 1.
6. For i = 1, 2, ..., n set up: {
ĉ = 1 i f Q
(1)
i > Q
(0)
i ,
ĉ = 0 i f Q
(1)
i < Q
(0)
i
If ĉHT = 0 or the number of iterations equals the maximum limit, stop; else, go to Step 2.
Here, H is the parity check matrix of the LDPC codes.
2.4 Petri nets
A PN is identified as a particular kind of bipartite directed graph populated by three types
of objects. They are places, transitions, and directed arcs connecting places and transitions.
Formally, a PN can be defined by:
N = 〈P , T ,F ,W〉
where:
a. T is the set of places, T is the set of transitions, P ∩ T = ∅
b. F ⊆ (P × T ) ∪ (T × P) is flow relationship
c. W : F → N assigns a weight or multiplicity to each arc.
Usually, actions are associated to transitions and conditions are associated to places. A transi-
tion is enabled if each input place of contains at least a number of tokens equal to the weight
of the arc connecting to. When an enabled transition fires, it removes tokens from its input
places and deposits them on its output places. PN models are suitable for representing sys-
tems that exhibit concurrence, conflict, and synchronization.
Some important PN properties include a boundness (no capacity overflow), liveness (freedom
from deadlock), conservativeness (conservation of non consumable resources), and reversibil-
ity (cyclic behavior). The concept of liveness is closely related to the complete absence of
www.intechopen.com
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deadlocks. A PN is said to be live if, no matter what marking has been reached from the ini-
tial marking, it is possible to ultimately fire any transition of the net by progressing through
further firing sequences. This means that a live PN guarantees deadlock-free operation re-
gardless of the firing sequence. Validation methods of these properties include reachability
analysis, invariant analysis, reduction method, siphons/traps-based approach, and simula-
tion (Reisig, 1986), (Reisig & Rozenberg, 1998).
3. System Description
Fig. 4 shows a block communication model we propose to communicate a header node and
the base station in a hierarchical WSN. This model should use an elliptic curve encryption
scheme and LDPC code in the process of messages transmission. On the left side we have the
header node, transmitter of the message, and on the right side we have the base node, receiver
of the message.
Fig. 4. Communication Model
In this model m represents the transmitted binary message sequence. This sequence gets into
the system to an Elliptic Curve Encrypter/LDPC Encoder block, where a transformation func-
tion converts them to an output code c, called usually a codeword. This codeword is the input
sequence to a modulator block which converts them in a modulated signal x, which goes
through the communication channel. Here the signal is disturbed by the noise coming from
transmission medium and suffers the fading effects own of the wireless channels. From this
process derives a corrupted signal xˆ, estimated from the signal x. Then the signal xˆ enters to
a demodulator block to be converted over again to a binary sequence. This sequence is called
cˆ and is an estimate of the codeword c. The LDPC Decoder / Elliptic Curves Decrypter block
receives the binary sequence and transforms them by means of an inverse function in a mes-
sage sequence mˆ which is an estimate of the original message m. The base station receives mˆ
as a valid message and the process finishes.
4. Modeling and Analysis
In this section we develop some derived PNmodels since the communication systemwe have
presented in the section 3. Firstly we analyze the system from the perspective of the commu-
nication among process. Then, we model a cryptography scheme which would be based on
an elliptic curve, which at the same time is defined on a finite field.
4.1 Communication System
Fig. 5, shows the PN diagram of the communication system consistent with the model we
presented on Fig. 4.
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Fig. 5. Petri Diagram of the Communication System
We have made some assumptions regarding to the system in order to simplify the model.
1. Both transmitter and receiver are idle before begin the communication;
2. The channel is always available, there is not fight in access to the channel;
3. The public and private keys associated with the EC, are considered resources always
available during a communication instance;
4. Both LDPC encoder and decoder are considered resources always available for the sys-
tem.
The meaning of each place and transition is described in the Table 1 and 2 respectively. The
initial marked which defines the system behavior denotes the following: The places P0 and P1
marked with one token tells us there is a new message and the transmitter is idle in order to
transmit it. The places P4, P5 denotes resource availability to achieve the encryption process
on the sender side. One mark in the place P4 will tell us that we count on a suitable EC and
the another one in the place P5 will tell us as well that we dispose a valid public key to work
on. In the same way the marks on the places P6 and P7 mean resource availability in order to
achieve the decryption process on receiver side. In this case, one mark in the place P6 tells us
that we dispose of the EC and anther one in the place P7 tells us that we count on a valid key
to work on, here, the private key of the receiver.
On the other hand we have the coding resources, in the graphic represented by the places P13
and P14. A token allocated on the place P13 denotes LDPC encoder availability whereas the
another one allocated on the place P14 shows the LDPC decoder is available. The places P22
and P23 represent noisy and fading processes into the channel. The tokens on these places
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denote presence of those processes. The last place marked from the initial marked of the net is
P21 which means that the channel is idle and free to transmit a signal.
Place Description Place Description
P0 New message P13 LDPC encoder (sender side)
P1 Transmitter idle P14 LDPC decoder (receiver side)
P2 Received message P15 Encoded message (codeword)
P3 Incoming message P16 Demodulated message
P4 EC on the sender side (resource) P17 Receiver idle
P5 Valid key (receiver public key) P18 Modulated message
P6 EC on the receiver side (resource) P19 Channel input
P7 Valid key (receiver private key) P20 Channel output
P8 Decrypted message P21 Channel Idle
P9 LDPC decoder and EC Restoring (receiver) P22 Fading process
P10 LDPC decoder and EC Restoring (sender) P23 Noise process
P11 Encrypted message P24 Channel parameters restoring
P12 Decoded message
Table 1. Places Description of PN in Fig. 5
Basically the PN shows different status that a message has to go through the communication
process. The transitions represent functions that transform the message into different phases
of process. Thus we have as follows:
1. Initially, the transition T0 is triggered, since the initial marked on the places P1 and P2
enable to do it. Then the message passes to incoming message status (place P3 is loaded
with a token);
2. The transitions T4 triggers, because of the tokens in its incoming places P3, P4, P5 en-
ables it. Then these ones are removed, new tokens are generated and allocated on the
single output place P11 passing to the encrypted message status.
3. In the same way the transition T7 triggers removing the tokens from the places P11
and P23 and loading another two into places P10 and P15. The token in P10 makes
conditional the resources restoring and the one in P15 turns the message into an encode
message status. On the other one the transition T5 triggers tokens which restore both the
curve and encode parameters.
4. A token on P15 enable the transition T9 which accomplishes his trigging passing to
modulated message status, (place P18 is marked with a token).
5. Enabled now, the transition T11 trigger removing the token from P18 and allocating one
into the place P0 and another one into the place P19 (message in the channel input).
www.intechopen.com
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Transition Description Transition Description
T0 Transmit message T7 Encode message
T1 Wait for message T8 Decode message
T2 Deliver message T9 Modulate message
T3 Decrypt message T10 Demodulate message
T4 Encrypt message T11 Send message to channel
T5 Restore parameters T12 Perturb message
T6 Restore parameters T13 Reset channel parameters
Table 2. Transitions Description of PN in Fig. 5
All these processes above encrypting-encoding-modulating belong to sender side, and in
inverse proportion to this we have the receiver side; demodulating-decoding-decrypting.
Nevertheless, we must as well to describe the channel process. Simply to say that if both
places P9 and P21 are loaded each with a token, besides the places P22 and P23 then the
transition T12 trigger. In other words, if there is a message in the channel input and this is
idle, on the other hand there are both the noisy and fading processes, then the disturbance
process is enabled which generate distortion in the message.
We perform two types of analysis over the PNmodel: a structural and a graph based analysis.
The aim of the first is to show that the amount of states is finite (boundedness) and that all the
represented activities can be done (liveness). The aim of graph based analysis is to determine
the absence of dead states. The analysis was performed with the Petri net analyzer tool INA
Roch & Starke. (1999).
Table 3 shows the structural analysis of the model of Fig. 5 where we can see there are eleven
P/Invariants including all places, so we can conclude that the net is bounded. There are
one T/Invariant (Table 7) covering all transitions, so the model is live. Finally the resulting
reachability graph has 80 states large enough to draw it here.
Place Invariants
1 P4 + P5
2 P6 + P7
3 P6 + P9
4 P4 + P10 + P11
5 P10 + P13
6 P6 + P12 + P14
7 P2 + P8 + P22 + P16 + P17
8 P0 + P3 + P4 + P10 + P15 + P8
9 P20 + P21
10 P22 + P23
11 P22 + P24
Transition Invariants
1 T1 + T2 + T3 + T4 + T5 + T6 + T7 + T8 + T9 + T10 + T11 + T12 + T13
Table 3. Place and Transition Invariants of the Net in Fig. 7.
4.2 Cryptographic Protocol
Wehave used a sequence diagram (Fig. 6) to describe part of a secure communication protocol.
It is based in the public key encryption scheme proposed by Menezes-Vanstone in (Menezes
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et al., 1993) but also we have considered (Ontiveros et al., 2006). Specifically is considered the
communication between a sensor and header node.
Fig. 6. Sequence Diagram of the Encryption and Decryption Process
It is important to consider the moments which operations are accomplished, with the aim of
minimizing communication times. The sensor and header node should have same elliptic
curve cryptoprocessor embedded in their architecture and both should know also a rational
point G which is a curve points generator.
The sequence diagram of Fig. 6 describes the behaviour of the protocol, as follows: when the
sensor node wishes to send a message m to their header node, sends a security communication
request. The header node reply with a acknowledgment of receipt (ack) leaving the communica-
tion established. Both nodes performs concurrent tasks, the sensor node generates a random
number r and computes C1 = r ∗ G, meanwhile the header node generates a random number
d and computes Q = d ∗ G. After, when the sensor node has completed its task it sends the
point computed C1 to the header node that receive it and sends the point Q to the sensor node.
Again, both nodes accomplish concurrent task with the received components as showed in the
Fig. 6.
The sensor node computes C2 = r ∗ Q and it get the coordinate x from C2 to compute it with
the message m which compress and send it to the header node. Meanwhile, the header node
B computes the point d ∗ C1 received and it gets its coordinate x which it will use next to the
decryption process. The next step consist in that collector node decompress and decrypts the
message m computing m = C2/x. Finally, in order to reduce the complexity, we assume that
the sensor node close the communication.
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Fig. 7. Petri Diagram of the Cryptography Scheme
The Fig. 7 represents the PNmodel of the communication protocol discussed previously. Fig. 4
shows the meaning of each place and Table 5 shows the meaning of each transition.
We perform two types of analysis over the PNmodel: a structural and a graph based analysis.
The aim of the first is to show that the amount of states is finite (boundedness) and that all the
represented activities can be done (liveness). The aim of graph based analysis is to determine
the absence of dead states. The analysis was perfomed with the Petri net analyzer tool INA
Roch & Starke. (1999).
Place Description Place Description
P0 Idle P10 Waiting Q
P1 Waiting for communication request P11 Q sent
P2 Ready to transmits P12 C2 computed
P3 Security communication request received P13 d ∗ C1 computed
P4 Communication request reply received P14 x obtained
P5 Communication request sent P15 Waiting c2
P6 Random Number r generated P16 c2 computed
P7 Random Number d generated P17 c2 decompressed
P8 C1 computed P18 c2 sent
P9 Q computed and waiting C1 P19 Communication closed
Table 4. Meaning of Places in Fig. 7
Table 3 shows the structural analysis of the model of Fig. 7 where we can see there are eleven
P/Invariants, including all places, so we can conclude that the net is bounded. There are
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one T/Invariant (Table 6 covering all transitions, so the model is live. Finally the resulting
reachability graph represented by the set shown in Table 7 has 42 states.
Place Description Place Description
t1 Start communication request t11 Get coordinate x from C2
t2 Processing communication request t12 Compute d ∗ C1
t3 Generate random number r t13 Compute c2m ∗ x
t4 Sending ack t14 Get x from d ∗ C1
t5 Compute C1 = r ∗ G t15 Compress and Send c2
t6 generate random number d t16 Decompress c2
t7 Sending C1 t17 Close communication
t8 Compute Q = d ∗ G t18 Compute m = c2/x
t9 Compute C2 = r ∗ Q t19 Return to wait communication request
t10 Sending Q
Table 5. Transitions Description of PN Fig. 7
Place Invariants
1 P0 + P2 + P3 + P4 + P5 + P6 + P7 + P8 + P9 + P10 + P12 + P14 + P16 + P18
2 P0 + P1 + P2 + P3 + P4 + P5 + P6 + P7 + P8 + P9 + P10 + P11 + P12 + P13 + P14 + P15 + P16 + P17
+ P19
Transition Invariants
1 t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 + t5 + t6 + t7 + t8 + t9 + t10 + t11 + t12 + t13 + t14 + t15 + t16 + t17 + t18 + t19
Table 6. Place and Transition Invariants of the Net in Fig. 7
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M0 = PO + P1 M21 = P18 + P19
M1 = P1 + P2 M22 = P0 + 2P15 + P19
M2 = P3 M23 = P2 + 2P15 + P19
M3 = P4 + P5 M24 = P13 + P15 + P18
M4 = P5 + P6 M25 = P0 + P13 + P15 + P19
M5 = P5 + P8 M26 = P2 + P13 + P15 + P19
M6 = P7 + P8 M27 = P14 + P15
M7 = P7 + P9 + P10 M28 = P11 + P16
M8 = 2P9 + P10 M29 = P11 + P15 + P18
M9 = 2P10 + P11 M30 = P0 + P11 + P15 + P19
M10 = P11 + P12 M31 = P2 + P11 + P15 + P19
M11 = P11 + P14 M32 = P12 + P13
M12 = P13 + P14 M33 = P12 + P15
M13 = P13 + P16 M34 = 2P10 + P13
M14 = P15 + P16 M35 = 2P10 + P15
M15 = 2P15 + P18 M36 = P8 + P9
M16 = P17 + P18 M37 = P5 + P9 + P10
M17 = P0 + P17 + P19 M38 = P6 + P7
M18 = P2 + P17 + P19 M39 = P6 + P9
M19 = P2 + 2P19 M40 = P4 + P7
M20 = P0 + 2P19 M41 = P4 + P9
Table 7. Reachability Set of PN in Fig. 7
5. Conclusion
We have used PN to model and formally analyze a communication system which holds a
elliptic curve encryption scheme and it could works on a WSN. The results obtained shows
formally that our approach are correct. However, we plan increase the complexity of models.
We should consider critical factors related to constrained capacities of sensors nodes. We have
analyze a more elaborate encryption scheme keep in mind adding a intermediate entity for
the keys management.
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